How does within couples'time-use interactions generate welfare in the family ? In this paper we model economies of scale in time use. Following Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2006), we allow intrahousehold bargaining power to a¤ect the distribution of welfare gains in the family. We estimate the model using the UK Time Use Survey (2000). Results suggest that two single individuals living apart need about 2h15 more to achieve the same utility level as when living in a couple. A woman requires on average 55% of the couple time-resources to be as well-o¤ as when living alone. Time-poverty line is on average 11h per individual a day.
Introduction
Equivalence scales are widely used to make interpersonal welfare comparisons of households of di¤erent sizes, compositions or characteristics. They allow converting observed expenditures of di¤erent types of households in comparable units (Lechene, 1993; Banks and Lewbel, 1997) . For example, sharing the accommodation, heating and so forth generates economies of scale and welfare gains that could be measured using equivalence scales.
These gains vary depending on household composition and income. They are widely applied to de…ne poverty lines for example. In practice, welfare level is exclusively de…ned on a good consumption basis (Nelson, 1993) .
However, the disposition of time can be viewed as "the ultimate source of utility" (Zeckhauser, 1973) , and time-poverty is a concept that is of growing interest in the literature (Vicker, 1977 In this paper, we estimate a household's time allocation model that allows identifying economies of scale in the time allocation of the family. We de…ne equivalence scales based on time-use. This paper brings a better understanding of how family interaction converts time into welfare. It allows answering the following questions: "How much time does a couple save by living together versus living apart?" "How much time would a single female require to attain the same utility that she would have if she lived in a couple?" Indeed, living in couple means saving time, because, for example, cooking for two does not require twice more time than cooking for one. Thus, living together and sharing create economies of scale within household, meaning that a widow needs more free-time than what she has to achieve the same welfare she had once living in a couple. To our knowledge, except Van Hoa and Ironmonger (1989) , there is no such attempt in the economic literature.
From a methodological viewpoint, our paper is situated in the literature that solves theoretical controversies regarding equivalence scales estimation.
Traditional equivalence scales de…ne an equivalent income at the household level, answering the following question: "what is the expenditure level required by a single household to be as well o¤ as if it was a household with several members?". To this aim, utility cardinalization is required (see Pollak and Wales, (1979, 1995) ; Gronau, 1988; Nelson, 1988; for more details). Second, traditional de…nition assumes that within households, welfare levels are equalized (Nelson, 1993) . Recently, Browning et al. Our model brings new elements to this framework. We introduce a timeuse technology function that re ‡ects intra-household economies of scales in time. The links between good and time consumption are clari…ed thanks to a time separability assumption which we test in the empirical part. Our contribution brings a …rst stone in the building of a complete model of intrahousehold welfare interaction due to consumption and leisure. We apply the model to UK time-use data. Results show that two singles living apart need 2h15 hours more free time to achieve the same utility level as living in couple.
A woman requires on average 55% of joint time-resources to be as well-o¤ as when she lives alone and men 52%. Time-poverty lines are also de…ned.
The theoretical model is presented in a …rst part, then the empirical ana-lysis and results are described in a second part. The last section concludes.
Household' s Daily Time allocation Choice
Time-use allocation decision is analyzed on a short term daily basis, i.e. the allocation of spare time amongst 'pure'leisure, housework, sleeping, personal care, and commuting. Medium term choices, such as consumption or hours of work are taken as given. We focus on dual-earner full-time working couples or single individuals without children. Household members', identi…ed by subscript i = f; m, are endowed with a well-behaved utility function depending on a vector of K commodities (denoted z):
The predetermination of consumption and hours of work choice makes sense. Indeed, the usual worker receives his wage and salary every month.
The labor contract de…ning wages and working hours is often signed for a longer time period. Working hours can evolve for shorter time periods, but this might mostly come from the employer's side to insure higher ‡exibility of the production process. In this perspective, hours of work could be modeled as time constraints.
We present the model under a separability assumption which requires that hours of work and consumption do not impact daily time allocation, except through an income e¤ect. If separability does not hold then Pareto-e¢ ciency in conditional program is not su¢ cient to guarantee Pareto-e¢ ciency for the unconditional one (Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir, 2005) . In this case identi…cation still holds but conditionally on medium run choices. The reach of the analysis is restricted. Separability between consumption and time-uses will be tested in the empirical part.
Time-use Technology Function
The time-use technology function is analogous to the consumption tech- 1 The interpretation in terms of economies of scale is more delicate since private equivalent goods are directly recovered on an individual basis from this technology function. Hence, disentangling production and consumption argument in the understanding of this consumption technology is less clear than in BCL model. On the other hand, the assignability property of time-use activities has the advantage of facilitating identi…cation of the model. 2 It is worth noticing that BCL show that the model is generically non-parametrically identi…ed meaning that identi…cation will only fail if the utility function or the technology function are too simple. de…ned in the following way:
, for k = 1; :::; K (1)
Time-use Demand for Singles
We …rst describe the behavior of single households. For sake of simplicity the household's subscript is omitted. In the medium run, the household chooses his consumption C and a total time of leisureT (or equivalently hours of work H since e T = T H). On a daily basis, each rational agent maximizes a well-behaved short-run utility function, denoted U; with respect to a daily time-use allocation, subject to a time-budget constraint, as well as a time constraint. We denote t = (t 1 ; :::; t K ) the individual time-use vector and e T ; the daily spare time:
Daily time-use demands can be equivalently written in the following way:
In the single individual case, prices of di¤erent activities are the same. This hinders identi…cation of price elasticities. However, since wage rates, as well as the short run spare time e T varies across individuals, under some parametric restrictions described later in the text, it is possible to identify these elasticities.
Commodities and Time-use Demand for Couples
Couple's daily allocation of time is supposed to follow a collective model (Apps and Rees, 1988; Browning et al., 1994) . Time allocation in the short run (i.e. on a daily basis) is e¢ cient and taken conditional on medium run consumption and labor supply choices. For the couple, individuals time-
Therefore, household daily time-allocation program (P c ) is for the case of couples:
The Pareto weight generally depends on prices, incomes and eventually distribution factors 3 It re ‡ects the weight of individual sub-utility in the household decision-making process. So generally, if the commodities are normal goods, higher is the weight for one household member, greater is his share of household private goods.
We now focus on interior solutions 4 . To this aim, broad de…nitions of type activities will be chosen in order to make sure that all household mem- 3 A distribution factor is a variable which a¤ects bargaining power but not preferences of individual household members or the joint budget set. 4 Extending the empirical approach to corner solutions would allow considering a greater number of time-use activities. However, this extension in a structural daily time-use allocation case is not straightforward. In structural collective models, considering nonparticipation of labor supply choices is now relatively standard (Donni, 2009; Bloemen, 2010) , it is not the case when considering several uses of time. Furthermore, in the case of daily time-use, additional identi…cation assumptions would be necessary to disentangle infrequent answers from actual non-participation choice in some daily activities (Browning and Bonke, 2006) . Given the novelty of the approach undertaken here, we keep this problem for further research. as a share of household second full income denoted by i :
In the decentralized case, the sharing rule is the share of income an individual living in a couple can spend on private commidities. The cost of private commodities is evaluated at a shadow price, denoted ; that itself depends on how economies of scales in time are generated in the household. Because of separability assumption between medium and short run, the Pareto weight and the associated sharing rule in the conditional program only depends on household time budget (which is the equivalent of second step income in a two-step budgeting procedure) as well as distribution factors.
In particular, prices, such as wage rates do not appear. If separability does not hold, then e¢ ciency at the sub-level cannot be guaranteed and prices could impact preferences for daily commodities z, as well as the sharing rule.
Pareto weights and sharing rule refer both to the bargaining power in the decision process: higher is the weight and the sharing rule f , greater are the private time equivalent consummed by the female individual z k f . Nevertheless, in principle, the identi…cation of the sharing rule is preferred, as that does not depend upon any cardinalizations of the utility functions U f and U m , contrary to the Pareto weight .
Each time-use activity has an implicit shadow value that can be computed (see Appendix A). Individual shadow prices do vary within the household, meaning that individuals have di¤erent marginal valuation for the activities:
where i is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the individual timeconstraint which represents the opportunity cost of domestic time for the household member i. Plugging preceding expression into Equation (1) leads to structural time-use demands:
Identi…cation
The reduced form time-use demands of couple depends only on observables e T i as well as observed heterogeneity variables x:
Structural time-use demands are de…ned above in Equation (6). They depend on commodity demands of both couple members, h f and h m ; and on parameters of the time-use technology function, A. Commodity demands depend themselves of shadow prices f and m that were derived in the preceding section. These prices are themselves a known function of observables as well as parameters of interest and Lagrangian multipliers f ; m which represents the opportunity cost of domestic time.
The identi…cation question is the following. Can we identify the K parameters of the time-use structural technology function and the two opportunity costs f ; m from the observation of the reduced form time-use functions (Equation (7)) obtained for couples and singles?
To this aim, some conditions must be satis…ed. at …rst sight. First, in the empirical speci…cation, preference heterogeneity is included so this assumption of preference equality is applied conditionnal on observed characteristics. Second, welfare interactions due to time-use in the family should be adequately controlled for. The time-use technology function does this. Our view is that it is the case that this function adequately summarizes these interactions. However, we recognize that this assumption could be problematic the marriage or divorce process in itself is related with time-use preferences or time-use interaction in the family, which is a situation that could not be formally excluded.
We know turn to the second condition. Structural estimation of the timeuse demand function for couples can only be complete if the identi…cation of time-use demand is achieved for singles. This is problematic since prices remain …xed for singles. So generally, price elasticities of each activity cannot be individually identi…ed. Indeed, if we denote h the structural time-use demand for singles and the reduced-form one, we have that :
where f F I is the full income minus consumption and p 1 = :::
In this case, price e¤ects cannot be separately identi…ed since is observed whereas h is not:
Assumption 2: Preferences are strongly separable and additive, and income e¤ects vary across activities.
This assumption leads to a direct utility function U (:) which is made up of sub-utility functions for each commodity group (t k ) combined additively, up to any monotonic transformation F:
The strong separability assumption for additive preferences allows to identify all price e¤ects using only one price variation and wealth e¤ects. 
Equivalent Income and Indi¤erence Scale
Economies of scale measure the extra time that two singles living apart 
where p is a vector of one.
Indi¤erence scales IS i represent the fraction of household time resources that a single i would require to consume the time private equivalents z i at market prices that put her on the same indi¤erence curve that she attained as living in a couple. Equivalence scales are de…ned as:
In expression (10), the numerator corresponds to the minimal time-expenditures spend by single individual to achieve the same welfare level as living in a couple; and the denominator corresponds to couple time-expenditure.
This concept involves the de…nition of the equivalent time resources T i describing the minimum amount of free-time called for consuming the vector of time private equivalent z i , which allows to attain the same welfare as in a couple. Equivalent income is de…ned as T i = P n k=1 (z 
Empirical Implementation 4.2.1 Empirical Speci…cation
We adopt a Stone-Geary utility function allowing identi…cation of all price e¤ects. For singles, the conditional program is:
where j are the Stone-Geary parameters which are individual and goodspeci…c, which represent the marginal budget shares; j is the incompressible levels of consumption of time-activity t j . The sum of all the proportions of the goods consumed must equal 1 ( K j=0 j = 1 and 0 < j < 1). The Stone-Geary utility function gives rise to the linear expenditure system. Adding observed and unobserved heterogeneity, the conditional demands of a single individual i for time-activity k have the following shape:
Parameters k i and k i are estimated using singles data. We parametrize k i in the following way, including heterogeneity in income e¤ects:
Concerning couples, starting from the decentralized program, time-use demand equations can be written in terms of shadow prices and the sharing rule:
where i = f F I i (x; s) and s includes female to male ratios of wage and education as distribution factors. It is worth noticing that we cannot identify the sharing rule i as the time-use demands is homogeneous of degree zero.
We assume that i corresponds to f F I i . Implicitly, it implies that we know the Pareto weight. The following estimation would be conditional to a given Pareto weight .
As we consider that gains from living together and the degree of publicness of time-activity could vary across household, we introduce heterogeneity in k which depends on demographics (female and male age, age squared, quali…cation):
Equation (16) 
Estimation Strategy
The system is estimated by means of the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) for singles and couples, assuming intra-group correlation, i.e.
that the error terms are correlated across activities within households but uncorrelated across households. 7 Personal care is considered as assignable and 1 = 0. 8 Socio-demographic controls are household net non-labor market weekly income, age, age squared, education, a dummy variable for house ownership, for car availability and four regional dummies. In couple estimations, female and male sets of socio-demographics are including in spite of high correlation within couples, as we assume that time allocation of each household member depends on both sets of individual characteristics.
To deal with the potential endogeneity of available time conditional to endogenous working hours, we estimate simultaneously time-use for four activities (personal care, housework, leisure and commuting) and time resources using exclusion restrictions. A natural instrument for working hours and, therefore for time resources, is wage considered as an opportunity cost. However, (Browning and Meghir, 1991) note that the use of wage as instrument leads to di¢ culties. Beyond the selection problem, which refers to observabil-7 GMM estimators are e¢ cient, even when there is heteroskedasticity of unknown form (which is not the case with 3SLS). The Pagan and Hall test for the presence of heteroskedasticity con…rms that GMM are called for. 8 To allow for adding-up the …rst activities (sleeping) was dropped and (n-1) activities are estimated: personal care, household work 'pure'leisure and commuting. ity of wages only for workers, wage could be endogenous, due to measurement error, omitted variable or reverse causality. As the average hourly wage is computed as the quotient of weekly earnings by weekly working hours, any measurement error should introduce a spurious negative correlation between this instrument and the endogenous variable, namely labor supply (Mroz, 1987) . Besides, household work and namely child care could be bought on the market, especially for individual with a higher leisure opportunity cost.
Moreover, if the price of some activities like commuting is correlated with wages, elasticities estimation could be biased. Second, wages are weakly correlated with the amount of working hours, because the labor market is characterized by labor contracts often de…ned by wage-hours package in the medium run.
Given those problems we prefer to use an alternative set of instruments determining wages and working hours. The complete set of instruments are demographics, a dummy variable for managerial responsibilities, for shift work and the local unemployment rate. As good predictors for wage estimation, work characteristics explain the amount of working hours and therefore, time resources. Good instruments should be both relevant and valid: correlated with the endogenous regressors and orthogonal to the errors. To check the relevance and the validity of our instrumental strategy, several tests was is 80.2. It is worth noticing that for singles, the over-identifying restriction tests implicitly correspond to homogeneity and symmetry restrictions tests.
Finally, we include two distribution factors in the full income estimations:
the female to male ratio of wage and quali…cation.
Separability Tests
Finally, we provide a separability test using a more general functional semi-parametric shape for time-use demands G. We model G using a ‡exible second order polynomial of e T , consumption C and demographics X (age, age squared, education, region and house ownership):
A simple test of weak separability consists of testing whether the timedemands t k i depend on the quantities of goods purchased C i . With the polynomial shape of our functional form, all we have to do is to test whether the marginal e¤ect of consumption on time-use is zero for all individuals i (H 0 ). If the null hypothesis (the marginal e¤ect of consumption on time-use demand is zero) is rejected, it would be a statistical evidence against our separability assumption. We use the total net household weakly income to proxy con-sumption. As the consumption C is endogenous, we use instruments that explain mainly hours of work and mainly belong to the employment characteristics: non-labor income, wage, a dummy variable if individual works full-time and their interactions. here are evaluated at sample means. Observing the estimates of the total net household weakly income on time-demands we see that some of them are signi…cant: the impact of on personal care for female in couple and on housework for male in couple. We conclude that separability between consumption and daily time-allocation assumption is rejected for couples but not for singles.
For couples, rejection of separability could be linked to non-separable utility function or non-separable time technology function: 10 To take into account the rejection of separability we adopt a conditional approach without separability by adding the household consumption in covariates for the time-use technology function:
The interpretation is interesting since C , or a share of C can be interpreted has buying market substitutes for time.
Results
The …rst paragraph deals with estimation of single females and single males to recover the preference parameters. Table 3 estimated in their reduced form. Table 4 The overall scale economy measure indicates that two singles living apart need 6.3% time more to achieve the same utility level as living in couple and maintaining the same preferences. A couple save 2h15 a day by living together. This estimation of economies of scale is an upper bound because di¤erences between market and shadow prices suggest that singles can reallocate and more cheaply attain the same indi¤erence curves: a woman (men) requires 55% (52%) of joint time-resources to be as well when she (he) lives alone.
Then, economies of scale by activity and household member is presented in Table 6 . Living in couple allows to save time. On average, a female wins to the sum of t k , that is total time resources e T , as z k = t k . 12 Obviously, these amounts depends on the level of economies of scales, for a given Pareto weight. Second, the median is computed. Third, individual with less than 60% of median equivalent time expenditures is considered to be time-poor.
For the complete sample, the median equivalent time expenditures is about 18h30. Hence, the time-poverty line is around 11h per individual a day. 13 It represents 3% of our sample, that is full-time worker living alone or with his partner without children or anydbody else in the household. 12 It is worth noticing that there are valued at market prices p = 1. 13 Reminder that is an average for working and non-working day.
individually-based de…nition of time-poverty. This could be used to de…ne an individual compensation after a divorce or a partner's death, or to compute and compensate costs related to children. To be fully operationnal from a policy perspective, a more complete model that would allow describing the link between income and time poverty is necessary. We could then move from a purely material redistributive aim to a broadly redistributive aim including the assessment of spare time. N o te th a t d u e to a d d in g -u p re stric tio n , tim e d e vo te d to sle e p in g is n o t e stim a te d . A b so lu te sta n d a rd e rro rs a re in p a re nth e se s. A b so lu te sta n d a rd e rro rs a re in p a re nth e se s.
B. Estimation Results

